Structural remedies are often preferred by competition authorities because they reshape market structure and avoid ongoing behavioural oversight. In digital ecosystem mergers, however, those same advantages may become limitations.
In a recent article for Antitrust Chronicle, RBB’s Ethel Fonseca
Ethel FonsecaPartner, Helder Vasconcelos
Helder VasconcelosPartner and George Tucker
George TuckerPrincipal identify three key challenges for structural remedies in digital markets.
First, products whose competitive strength depends on integration within an ecosystem may not remain viable as stand-alone divestment businesses.
Second, potentially harmful elements, such as data, may be inseparable from benign or efficiency-enhancing ecosystem assets.
Third, under ecosystem theories of harm, the source of the alleged competitive concern is also the source of the consumer benefit: removing the former may therefore sacrifice the latter.
Drawing on recent EU practice, including Google/Fitbit, Meta/ Kustomer, Booking/Etraveli, and Microsoft/Activision, they argue that structural remedies are not necessarily the best default response to ecosystem concerns. In some cases, behavioural commitments may better preserve merger-specific efficiencies while addressing the identified harm. The appropriate remedy should therefore depend on a case-by-case assessment of the theory of harm, the source of efficiencies and the practical feasibility of each remedial option.
Article published in CPI Antitrust Chronicle, June 2026.
Read the full article here.
